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Emerge in a Modern Democracy? Evidence from 
Greece’s Golden Dawn 
 
Costas Roumanias*, Spyros Skouras¤, Nicos Christodoulakis® 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
By local and international standards, Golden Dawn (GD) is at the far end of Extreme Right, yet it 
has emerged as Greece’s third largest party, gaining most of its electoral support within 
months, in early 2012. Its electoral rise has been attributed to the severe economic crisis the 
country had previously and since experienced. We investigate this remarkable case study 
econometrically, using both panel vote-share, and individual vote-intent regressions. Dramatic 
changes in parameters provide congruent evidence that GD’s success was due to a change in 
voter behaviour, rather than changes in individual characteristics or contextual conditions. 
Around one third of this change was due to GD’s success in taking ownership of the previously 
ownerless niche issues of immigration and law-and-order; the remaining change is attributed to 
its success in attracting financially distressed voters and voters fitting a typical Extreme Right 
demographic. Auxiliary evidence suggests this change was driven by a massive realignment of 
voters fleeing mainstream parties, after a coalition government imposed harsh austerity 
measures. 
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1. Introduction  
Greece’s Golden Dawn (GD) party is one of the few cases on record of an extreme right (ER) 
political formation achieving consistent and ongoing electoral success, and an especially striking 
case because it sits at the extreme end of the ER. Investigating how an ER party with negligible 
popularity for over twenty years became the third largest political party should be of relevance 
beyond the specifics of GD and a useful case-study to understand ER voter inclinations. In other 
countries political parties of comparable ideological extremity might exist but these have been 
so far operating in the fringe, as for example the British BNP or the German NPD; (party 
acronyms are detailed in Appendix A). Examining the critical factors that led a party of such 
extremity from the political margin to consolidating a position as a national player, is instructive 
and can help identify in time potential causes of political extremism. In addition, the sudden 
increase in GD’s popularity is interesting because, as we shall see, it demonstrates the impact 
good positioning in issue space can have on electoral performance. 
 
Our comprehensive contextual and individual-level survey data allow us to empirically analyse 
the determinants of GD’s electoral success in a regression context. Using this data, we develop 
a detailed econometric analysis that tracks GD’s rise from an ER fringe party similar to those of 
several other European countries, to the third position in the national political scene. This is 
remarkable, especially since Greece no longer has a bipartisan political system, so smaller 
parties carry significant influence. Our analysis contributes to the existing literature in three 
distinct ways. It reveals that the meteoric rise in GD’s vote shares were caused by a structural 
break in voter behavior. Furthermore, this structural change was abrupt, took effect within a 
few months and can be placed according to our data between December 2011 and May 2012. 
We link the rise in the support for GD to parts of the constituency that attribute high 
importance to issues of immigration and law-and-order. GD gained among these groups far 
more than other right-wing parties, indicating that it managed to be more efficient in gaining 
ownership of those issues2.  
 
Finally, we are able to access quantitatively the validity of existing popular wisdom and 
theoretical scholar analysis that the rise of GD can be mechanically and exclusively attributed to 
the evolution of the economic crisis in Greece.  Our data shows that this holds only partially. 
Socioeconomic indicators alone fail to fully explain this rise as effectively as the change in 
voting behavior that is more generically associated with the prevailing political climate. The 
change was abrupt and cannot be accounted for by a number of specific socioeconomic 
conditions (and in these we have included cumulative effects on conventional indices of 
socioeconomic deterioration). It rather seems that the sudden change coincided with the 
signing of the second bailout agreement between Greece and its official creditors, consisted of 
the European Union, the European central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The 
fiscal consolidation measures of the second program coincided with the enforced partial default 
                                                 
2Although anti-immigrant talk was present in the rhetoric of other right-wing parties such as populist radical right 
LAOS (Ellinas 2013), the extremity of GD’s position and physical violence towards immigrants was unmatched. Our 
analysis of individual vote-intention data shows a high concentration of voters concerned about these issues 
among the GD supporters, compared to any other party.   
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on domestic holders3 of Government bond, fuelling the sentiment that harsh austerity was to 
continue for a period much longer and to an extent much deeper than initially envisaged.  This 
might have been a shock strong enough to bring about changes in political behaviour.  
We should clarify from the outset that we use the term ER throughout this paper in the sense 
proposed by Mudde (2007) to refer to the extreme end (including for example Hungary’s 
Jobbik, Germany’s NPD or the U.K.’s BNP) of a broader Far Right4 (e.g. France’s Front Nationale, 
Austria’s FPÖ or Switzerland’s Swiss People’s Party inter alia)5. Most empirical research on the 
ER vote is based on cross-country European survey data (e.g. Arzheimer 2009, Lubbers et al., 
2002), contextual regional vote-share data within a country (e.g. Stockemer, 2016) or country-
level data (e.g. Golder, 2003). In analysing GD, we have the benefit of a much larger voter base 
than is usually the case with ER studies, alleviating some of the econometric issues surrounding 
modeling vote regressions with low or zero vote counts. By collecting a wide range of 
contextual and survey data, we are able to report both contextual and individual regressions, 
combining evidence to present a congruent and robust view of factors influencing the GD vote 
and side-stepping controversial issues about which approach is preferable (Arzheimer 2012). 
Specifically, we use (i) a panel spanning election outcomes across 56 regions and seven national 
and European elections that includes a battery of contextual explanatory variables; and (ii) 
10,000 individual responses in five waves of detailed surveys conducted by a leading polling 
firm in Greece. 
Some observers believe that GD’s success is a unique phenomenon, potentially of limited 
relevance outside Greece, as they tend to attribute it mainly to the local financial crisis. Indeed, 
GD’s jump in popularity was observed in the national elections of May 2012, the first after 
Greece’s crisis was felt (technically, a recession began in late 2008, before the European and 
National elections in June and October 2009, however the severity of the crisis was not widely 
appreciated until after those elections6). This observation has been widely interpreted as 
suggesting that individuals hit hardest by the crisis turned to GD to protest against mainstream 
parties. However, this is not borne out in our econometric analysis on GD voting, where only a 
limited impact is identified through purely pocket-book effects, including unemployment, GDP 
                                                 
3The Private Sector Involvement scheme (PSI) was exercised in 2012. A partial default of up to 75% of nominal 
value applied to retail holders, social security funds and other institutions.  
4There is a wide variation on the terminology used to refer to the Far Right. Some authors use the term «Extreme 
Right» more generically to refer to both radical right and to extremist, anti-democratic right. For a detailed 
exposition of the terminology used see Mudde (2007). We follow Mudde (2007) and reserve the term Extreme 
Right for the most extreme, antidemocratic, end of the Far Right and use «Far Right» as encompassing term 
including both the less extreme Radical Right and the ER (neo-fascist/neo-Nazi) parties. 
5Despite lack of unanimity in classification criteria, most analysts agree that ER is determined from parties’ 
affinities to historical fascism (Ignazi 1992, 2002, Golder 2003, Mudde 2007, Minkenberg 2013).  ER parties are 
characterised by anti-democratic ideologies and attitudes (Mudde 2007). It should be noted that irrespective of 
method of classification, GD falls easily within the most extreme category (ER, neo-fascist). 
6For example, unemployment remained under 10% till 2010 but eventually reached almost 30% in 2013; for a 
description of the situation in Greece see OECD (2016); on the origins of the crisis and a critical assessment of 
policy responses, see Christodoulakis (2015). Note also, that GD obtained 5.3% of the votes in the municipality of 
Athens in the 2010 municipal elections, but negligible support in other municipalities or nationally. The first time it 
registered substantial support was in the national elections in 2012. 
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or personal and business bankruptcies at the contextual level, or extremely negative views of 
economic conditions in surveys. We find that such effects account for about one third of GD’s 
increase in vote-intent regressions, and less so in contextual regressions. 
Figure 1: Vote intent in polls 
 
Note: We depict the vote intent in polls across all major polling firms for right-wing coalition government members 
of New Democracy and LAOS versus non-coalition government members of GD and Independent Greeks (ANEL). 
The coalition government was formed in November 2011, including New Democracy, the socialist party PASOK and 
the right-wing party of LAOS. Austerity measures were voted in February 2012 amid an unprecedented break-out 
of violent protests in Athens and other cities. The Government finally resigned in April 2012, opening the way for 
the elections in May 2012.  
Data source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_Greek_legislative_elections,_2012 
 
On the other hand, we find that a third of GD’s vote increase was driven by voters who were 
concerned with immigration and law-and-order (issues that did not become more severe 
around the time of GD’s popularity surge) and the size of this effect is robust across both vote-
intent and contextual regressions. The remaining increase in GD voting, was driven by GD’s 
appeal to voters in ER-friendly demographic groups (young, male, unmarried, with moderate 
education level) and voters who were exposed to a right-wing tradition (based on contextual 
proxies for such tradition).  
Perhaps even more strikingly, the break-up of voters’ ties with mainstream parties and their 
transition to GD did not follow a smooth (even if steep) path alongside the deterioration of the 
country’s economic conditions. Instead it was abrupt and took place within the first months of 
2012, pointing towards specific socio-political triggers. What caused these voters to turn to GD 
in early 2012? To understand this, we need to appreciate the broader political scene at the 
time, especially an agreement between a coalition government and international partners in 
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February 2012 to implement harsh austerity. This caused unprecedented riots and an exodus of 
voters from mainstream parties participating in this coalition, which was widely blamed for the 
country’s condition (Figure 1 illustrates this exodus in early 2012). In this context, it is sensible 
that voters in natural ER demographics, voters with anti-immigration sentiment or those 
looking for a powerful protest vote, would be attracted to GD. This transition was likely 
facilitated by increased media attention GD was receiving, especially in the Internet (see Figure 
2), which likely became self-reinforcing once its popularity started trending and voters began 
exploring its platform7. Empirically, the country’s political upheaval and ongoing shift away 
from mainstream coalition-government parties is evident in the form of robust evidence of 
parameter variation between 2009 and 2012 in our contextual vote-share regressions and 
between 2011 and 2012 in survey data vote-intent regressions8. 
Figure 2: Google Trend Search frequency. 
 
Note: Google Trend Search Indexes represent the relative search frequency of the names of the five largest parties 
with names that do not have plausible variants that might be used in any search (we exclude New Democracy 
which may be searched with many variants). 
 
We believe our findings have broader implications, beyond Greece: In conditions creating voter 
mobility, extreme fringe parties can strategically position themselves to take selective 
ownership of key issues and thereby capture a significant portion of the electorate. Mainstream 
                                                 
7The rise in public interest towards GD might not have itself directly triggered a rise in its support, which might 
have been triggered primarily through its grassroots activity, it is indicative of the attention that GD was receiving 
at the time and is probably associated to the general interest around the party that was increasing its electoral 
share. 
8While parameter variation is sometimes attributed to an omitted variable problem (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 
2000), in our analysis it is very plausible that this break reflects a shift away from mainstream parties. 
  
 
5 
parties might find it difficult to take a clear stand on thorny or controversial issues such as 
immigration, creating a void that extreme parties can exploit to capitalise on concerns of 
voters, particularly those in ER-friendly demographics. Our evidence suggests that given ripe 
conditions, this ER demographic may very quickly organise itself around an appropriate leader.  
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide some background 
on GD’s ideology and issue focus. We then briefly review literature attempting to explain the 
vote of ER parties broadly and GD’s success more specifically. Section 3 describes our individual 
level and contextual data, introduces our econometric models and reports our empirical results. 
Section 4 summarises our conclusions. An Appendix describes data and related details. 
 
Figure 3: GD vote across electoral districts and elections 
 
Note: Expressed as percentage of local valid vote count, for each of 56 electoral districts across seven elections 
studied in this paper. Electoral districts are labeled with the acronym of each district, preceded by the acronyms of 
the region they belong to (see Appendix A3.3). Graphs denote National (N) or European (E) elections and the 
relative year. In 2012, there were two elections in May and June respectively. 
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2. GD and related Extreme Right research 
2.1 Background on GD  
For a long time after it registered as a political party in 1990, GD received negligible electoral 
support. Figure 3 displays the GD vote in all national and European elections since 2007. The 
first noteworthy characteristic is that it never received more than 0.5% of the vote before 2010. 
That year, it made a noticeable appearance in the municipal elections of Athens, scoring 5.3% 
of the local vote and electing its leader to the local council. In the national elections of May 
2012, GD rocketed to 6.97% of the vote, winning 21 of 300 seats in the Parliament. Since then, 
in three national and one European Parliament elections, it has received between 6% and 10%, 
and remained the third most popular party in Greece all recent elections. Regarding the vote 
distribution across constituencies, Figure 3 reveals a strong regional dispersion, suggesting that 
local variations in socioeconomic conditions or political traditions may play an important role in 
shaping voting choices. However, the closeness of the graphs corresponding to the three 
national elections of May 2012, June 2012 and January 2015 points to a very solid pattern in 
each region, thus implying that GD voting is mostly affected by more resilient factors rather 
than by circumstantial developments. Both of these findings highlight the need for a systematic 
contextual analysis of the GD vote. 
2.1.1 Ideological Identity 
GD was formed in the early 1980s but registered as a political party in 1990. Most observers 
agree that it has a National Socialist/neo-fascist ideology9, anti-systemic, anti-democratic, anti-
immigrant outlook, and open endorsement of violent crimes against immigrants and their 
supporters (Ellinas 2013, Geogriadou 2013). In September 2013, GD’s leadership was arrested, 
facing trial for criminal actions including complicity to murder. Many observers (e.g. Dinas et al, 
2013) see GD as surpassing most ER parties in both radicalism and extremity of actions. 
Although other radical right parties in Greece have taken explicit stands towards limiting 
immigration, no other party has been as indiscriminately anti-immigrant or has based its openly 
racist agenda on biological and ethnic purity arguments. Furthermore, GD differs from the 
other existing radical right-wing parties (LAOS and ANEL) in its explicit anti-parliamentarian and 
anti-democratic narrative and in its open and applied endorsement of extreme physical 
violence towards immigrants. The extremity of GD’s stands and actions have probably 
contributed significantly towards convincing its electorate that it means business, particularly in 
critical issues such as immigration and law and order. The popularity of this type of ER is 
particularly paradoxical in Greece, which in the last century experienced disastrous military 
dictatorships, an extremely brutal Nazi occupation and substantial emigration of Greeks who formed 
sizable and successful immigrant communities in other countries.  
 
2.1.2. GD’s issue positioning 
As is the case with many European ER parties, GD’s trademark has been an anti-immigration 
rhetoric emphasising ‘cultural contamination’ and the loss of Greeks’ jobs to lower-paid foreign 
                                                 
9 See for example Georgiadou (2013). 
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workers. As unemployment rose during the crisis years, this message gained appeal, paralleling 
the experience of several countries.10 Wike et al. (2016) report that 72% of Greek respondents 
considered refugees a burden. This was exacerbated by associations of immigration with 
crime11 that allowed GD to conflate anti-immigration with a law-and-order rhetoric and blame 
the ‘contamination of Greece’s ethnic purity’.  
In terms of style, GD has developed a military aesthetic that appeals to young, single, 
moderately educated males –a typical demographic characteristics of ER voters (Arzheimer 
2012)— and has cultivated a grass-root support base, often organised into violent groups12. 
This reflects its view that non-democratic means for pursuing its political objectives are 
legitimate.  
 
2.2 Existing explanations for the success of GD 
2.2.1 Research specific to GD 
Existing literature on GD has focused primarily on supply side factors that enabled the party to 
seize hold of a sizeable electoral share. Dinas et al. (2013) study the effect of grassroot 
mobilisation of party members on the electoral success in the municipal elections of 2010 in 
Athens. They show that the party faired considerably better in areas where it enjoyed visibility, 
compared to similar areas where it mobilised less. Despite GD’s local success in 2010, its 
national appeal was still negligible until 2012, as is evident from intent-to-vote surveys. Ellinas 
and Lamprianou (2016) place GD’s main organizational and activity expansion to a national level 
towards the end of 2012, after its national electoral breakthrough.  
Research on the demand side has offered some informal evidence of the factors that might 
have affected the GD vote. For example, Ellinas (2013) and Georgiadou (2013) use exit poll data 
from the national elections in May 2012 to attribute the party’s electoral success to ‘a massive 
realignment of the electorate away from mainstream parties’ due to the crisis-related 
deterioration in economic conditions. The demand side explanations offer useful working 
theories on the reasons driving GD’s sudden rise and call for empirical verification. Our data 
allows us to quantify the extent to which variation in individual and regional economic 
conditions can explain variation in GD support and compare the validity of this explanation to 
others. Our findings are consistent with the view that the Greek far right experienced a massive 
re-alignment and furthermore, we can trace the causes for this to sudden changes in voter 
behaviour in the first months of 2012 rather than to more gradual socioeconomic triggers. 
Turning to the role of immigration, Dinas et al. (2016) exploit a quasi-natural experiment 
related to the differential inflows of immigrants on various Greek islands sharing similar 
characteristics, to estimate the causal effects of immigration on GD support. They find that 
exposure to drastic increases in refugee arrivals contributed to a 2% rise in GD’s electoral rates. 
                                                 
10 Turner and Cross (2015). 
11 Tsiganou et al (2010: 78) report that foreigners were responsible for 20% of total criminal activity (with the 
limitations that come with measures based on arrests) in 2007, up from 3% in 1995 
12 Sakellariou (2015) argues this has helped recruiting young supporters. 
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However, we cannot infer the importance of immigration for GD’s national vote from this 
estimate. In our regional analysis, we measure this directly and find that GD gained 
approximately 2% of the electorate due to concern with immigration, a finding broadly 
consistent with Dinas et al (2016) results. We also highlight the role of media coverage in 
making GD more visible. More broadly, we show that the party’s rapid ascent cannot be 
attributed to sudden changes in socioeconomic factors, but rather to structural changes in 
voting behaviour, the roots of which should likely be traced to shifts of voters away from 
mainstream parties as well as GD’s increased visibility and media coverage. On the limited 
effects of economic conditions on political extremism, Lamprianou and Ellinas (2016) use 
survey data to show that radical political action is only marginally connected to relative 
economic deprivation but strongly associated with ideology, organisation membership and 
personal characteristics. 
2.2.2 Broader research explaining the ER vote in an international context 
Individual-level studies of the ER vote focus on the effect of demographics, individual attitudes 
and contextual variables. Several studies confirm ER’s appeal to younger ages, male voters, low 
or middle education levels and blue-collar workers (Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Arzheimer 
2009, Lubbers et al. 2002). The ER vote is also related to anti-immigration attitudes, political 
dissatisfaction, national pride and to attributing high importance to law-and-order (Lubbers and 
Scheepers 2000, Lubbers et al. 2002). In contextual analyses, the impact of immigration on the 
ER vote is usually positive (Arzheimer, 2009, Coffé et al. 2007, Swank and Betz 2003, Dinas & 
van Spanje 2011) with few exceptions (Arzheimer & Carter 2006). Unemployment has also been 
analysed extensively, but with mixed conclusions as to the direction or existence of an effect 
(Inglehart and Norris 2016, Golder 2003, Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Coffé et al. 2007, Jesuit et 
al. 2009, Lubbers et al. 2002, Knigge 1998). 
The literature has occasionally considered the effect of other socioeconomic factors on the ER 
vote. Funke et al. (2016) find evidence that financial crises lead to increases in extreme voting; 
Swank & Betz (2003) link the far-right vote with higher tax rates and lower levels of social 
protection. Coffé et al. (2007) find a negative effect of income inequality. We explored a range 
of variables listed in the Appendix to explain the GD vote, but in our analysis report only 
regressions with statistically significant variables.  
 
3.  Empirical Results 
3.1. Data 
Our individual-level data is from the TASEIS polls, conducted biannually by MRB Hellas, 
www.mrb.gr, a leading Greek polling company, containing detailed personal information, 
quantitative assessments of Greece’s current and future economic conditions, choices among 
options for the most pressing issues in Greece, and interviewees’ last vote and vote intent in a 
hypothetical election to be held within a week from the interview date. Our sample spans five 
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interview dates on December 2011, December 2012, June 2013, December 2013 and June 2014 
and contains 9,621 usable observations roughly equally distributed across dates13. 
Our contextual data was gathered for Greece’s 56 electoral districts, each electing a fixed 
number of MP’s based on a reinforced proportional representation system which did not 
change throughout our sample14. This data includes unemployment rates; immigration density 
(ratio of residents of foreign origin to natives); regional crime rates; bounced checks and 
mortgages in arrears by electoral district; bank deposits; tourist visitors; and GDP per capita in 
purchasing power standards. Detailed definitions and sources of data is provided in Appendix A. 
Summary statistics for all variables appearing in our reported results are provided in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for dependent variables and regressors appearing in our 
individual GD vote-intent and contextual GD vote-share regressions. 
    Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
In
d
iv
id
u
al
 d
at
a 
Dependent GD vote intention 9,621 0.093 0.290 0 1 
Demographics Male 9,621 0.494 0.500 0 1 
  Age/100 9,621 0.467 0.179 0.21 0.75 
  Temporarily Unemployed 9,621 0.062 0.242 0 1 
  Married 9,621 0.615 0.487 0 1 
  Secondary education 9,621 0.590 0.492 0 1 
  Urban 9,621 0.215 0.411 0 1 
Attitudes Gloom 9,621 0.347 0.485 0 1 
Issues immigration 9,621 0.066 0.249 0 1 
  crime 9,621 0.008 0.027 0 0.1 
  transparency 9,621 0.075 0.264 0 1 
C
o
n
te
xt
u
al
 d
at
a 
Dependent GD vote actual 392 4.137 3.791 0.007 15.451 
Social immigration 448 0.833 0.403 0.137 1.999 
  crime 448 3.190 2.767 0.190 11.172 
Economic tourism 448 0.093 0.152 0.001 0.812 
  unemployment 448 1.601 0.819 0.048 3.880 
  economic output 448 1.616 0.449 0.940 2.940 
  bounced cheques 448 0.250 0.227 0.006 1.818 
  non-performing mortgages 448 2.434 2.643 0.039 15.757 
  Right Wing tradition 448 0.336 0.103 0.059 0.595 
                                                 
13The polls use face-to-face interviews and secret ballots. Each sample of 2000 individuals is designed to be 
representative with respect to demographics. From a total of 10,000 individuals we excluded 379 observations for 
individuals who did not provide responses to some of the variables used in our analysis. A poll scheduled for June 
2012 did not take place because two elections (May and June 2012) took place around its scheduled date. A 
detailed description of all our variables is provided in Appendix A1. 
14The representation system remained intact from 2007 to the present with minor seat reallocations among 
constituencies after the 2011 Census. 
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3.2 The GD Vote 
GD’s national elections vote-share rocketed from 0.29% in October 2009 to 6.97% in May 2012. 
Before turning to a detailed discussion of what caused the dramatic increase in GD voting, it is 
instructive to begin with an examination of the characteristics of individuals expressing intent-
to-vote for GD in surveys. In Table 2, we report LPM and Probit regressions with a range of 
regressors describing individuals (selected as the most economically and statistically salient 
effects from a broader set listed in Internet Appendix A1; here and below we also considered 
regressions merging contextual with survey data as well as various types of nonlinearities, 
without gaining any additional insights). Overall our results are reasonably robust across these 
two models. 
We find a very high coefficient on a gender dummy, meaning that the GD vote is larger by 8-
10% (depending on whether we use Probit marginal effects or LPM coefficients) for unmarried 
males compared to married or unmarried females. This effect is reduced by half in married 
men. Note that we control for age, which reduces the propensity to vote for GD by 0.1% per 
year, so the importance of marriage for males does not reflect the fact that married men are on 
average older than unmarried men. The propensity to vote for GD increases for temporarily 
unemployed workers, individuals with secondary (but not tertiary) education and individuals 
living in rural areas.  
 
Turning attention to individuals’ attitudes, we find that the Gloom attitude (a dummy indicating 
the most negative answer in all five attitude questions, described in more detail in Appendix 
A1) leads to support for GD, as does identifying immigration, crime or lack of transparency as 
one of the country’s three top problems (other available options are listed in Appendix A1). We 
can get a sense for the overall influence of attitudes and issue concerns on the GD vote, by 
multiplying coefficients with the mean of each variable. Based on LPM estimates, each of the 
above effects contributes 1.7%, 2.0%, 0.3% and 0.3% respectively towards the propensity to 
vote for GD. Most of these influences are largely in line with characteristics of ER voters 
internationally. However, our focus is on explaining the jump in GD support, whereas in most 
other ER analyses, changes in behavior over time have not been addressed. 
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Table 2: Individual-level Analysis of GD Voting 
This table reports the results of individual-level regressions with intention to vote for GD as dependent 
variable. The data comes from five polls conducted between December 2011 and June 2014. The first 
column reports OLS estimates of a linear probability model. The second column reports probit coefficient 
estimates for the same model. The third column reports marginal effects for Probit, evaluated at the 
mean of all variables. Standard errors are reported below all estimates. Regressor definitions and data 
sources are listed in Appendix A1. Statistical significance at the 10% level is indicated in bold. Number of 
observations: 7,713. 
  LPM 
Probit 
Coefficients 
Probit 
Marginal Effects 
Constant 0.07 -1.50 
  0.02 0.11 
Male 0.09 0.48 0.08 
  0.01 0.06 0.01 
Married 0.01 0.04 0.01 
  0.01 0.06 0.01 
Married x Male -0.05 -0.21 -0.04 
  0.01 0.06 0.01 
Age (/100) -0.11 -0.67 -0.12 
  0.02 0.15 0.03 
Temporarily 
Unemployed 0.03 0.15 0.03 
  0.01 0.06 0.01 
Secondary education 0.03 0.18 0.03 
  0.01 0.06 0.01 
Gloom 0.05 0.27 0.05 
  0.01 0.04 0.01 
Problems: 
immigration 0.29 1.05 0.18 
  0.03 0.08 0.02 
Problems: crime 0.04 0.20 0.04 
  0.01 0.07 0.01 
Problems: 
transparency 0.04 0.20 0.03 
 
0.02 0.08 0.02 
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.1 
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3.3. The increase in support for GD is due to a change in voting behavior 
We now turn to understanding the dramatic increase in support for GD between the 
consecutive national elections of October 2009 and May 2012. One celebrated explanation is 
that the election of May 2012 was the first after Greece’s financial crisis had begun being felt, 
and the economic hardship the crisis inflicted, turned voters towards GD. We argue that there 
are two problems with this explanation. First, while this is not widely appreciated, GD’s 
popularity was growing very slowly until early 2012 and increased extremely rapidly in a very 
narrow time window in early 2012 (it first appeared in a national poll in February 2011 at 0.5% 
and trended upwards slowly to around 1.5% till the end of that year, then it rocketed to almost 
7% by early May 2012)15. On the same issue, our survey data indicates that in December 2011, 
the intent to vote for GD was only 1.3%, in agreement with other polls (as in Figure 3).  
 
Contrary to popular narratives, this suggests that the rapid rise in GD’s support was due to 
abrupt changes in voting behavior rather than abrupt changes in daily economic conditions, and 
moreover that the voting behavior changed in the space of a few months. A key political 
development around this time was the signing of the second bail-out agreement 
(“Memorandum” in common parlance), implementing deep fiscal cuts, in February 2012. At the 
same time, a default on Government bonds affected Social Security funds as well as many 
private individuals, contrary to promises for an immunising debt-restructuring scheme. During 
deliberations in Parliament, riots and clashes with the police took place in Athens and other 
major cities, inaugurating a new period of violent reaction against austerity policies. The 
mainstream conservative New Democracy and right-wing LAOS parties that previously thrived 
on anti-austerity rhetoric had by then become partners in a broad coalition Government. By 
voting for the austerity measures, they triggered massive outflows of sympathisers and rank-
and-file party members to other emerging players, such as the radical-left SYRIZA, the right-
wing Independent Greeks and GD, all of which enjoyed a clear rise which continued to trend 
until the elections. 
 
Second, as we shall see in our panel data, variables that proxy for the severity of the crisis at a 
local level (unemployment, GDP and bankruptcies) do not explain the cross-sectional 
distribution of GD voting even after controlling for other factors. In other words, there is little 
evidence that GD voting was more intense in areas where the crisis was more severe. Other 
factors of nation-wide significance played a crucial role. We next quantify the importance of 
changes in behavior vs. changes in conditions using both individual-level and contextual 
regressions. 
 
3.3.1. Individual-level analysis 
To understand changes in voting behavior after controlling for the effect of changes in 
economic conditions, Table 3 presents regression analyses using dummy variables to measure 
                                                 
15GD’s significant support in a few municipalities in the 2010 municipal elections, was localised and can account for 
a small fraction of the national legislative electorate. Combined with negligible support in polls for legislative 
elections, this suggests that the increase in GD’s vote 2012 was separate to the local increase in support it received 
in certain municipalities in the municipal elections. 
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how the impact of various regressors changed between surveys in December 2011 and 
December 2012. Evidently, the change is dramatic, with meaningful and statistically significant 
changes in most coefficients.  
In the LPM models used, the propensity to vote for GD in 2009 is: 
      (1) 
 
In 2012, the propensity to vote for GD is: 
   (2) 
 
where terms like  appear as coefficients of interaction terms with a dummy for 2012. The 
coefficients } appear in the first column and } appear in the second column of the table.  
Subtracting the first equation from the second, the change in the GD vote is:  
   (3) 
 
The first term in each parenthesis in (3) measures the impact of changes in voting behavior, 
while the second term measures the impact of changes in conditions/attitudes on the GD vote. 
The last two columns of Table 3, decompose the change in GD’s vote and show that it is almost 
entirely due to changes in behavior. Most importantly, of GD’s vote increase by 6.68% between 
2009 and 2012, 4.12% was obtained by convincing voters with (mostly pre-existing) gloomy, 
anti-immigration and anti-crime attitudes to vote for it, with the remaining increase coming 
almost entirely from more GD voting among males. We believe this last effect is best 
interpreted as an outsized increase in GD’s appeal to a male demographic that is traditionally 
more akin towards the ER. This likely represents a fraction of the individuals fleeing mainstream 
coalition government parties. 
 
3.3.2. Contextual analysis 
Our finding that GD’s support was driven by changes in behavior is confirmed and reinforced in 
detailed contextual regression analysis presented in Tables 4 and 5, which approach the same 
issue with a broad range of additional controls. 
 
In Table 4, we report a regression of the GD vote across 56 electoral districts on key regressors, 
for each of the seven elections in our sample, starting before GD became prominent. Evidently, 
from 2012 onwards, the sign and magnitude of the coefficients on several regressors change 
drastically. There is strong evidence that from 2012 onwards, GD was able to tap into voting 
pools in areas with large concentrations of immigrants, high crime-rates, long-standing right-
wing tradition, and low tourism. Changes in coefficients associated with economic conditions 
do not display any clear statistically significant pattern. The first thing to note is that changes 
took effect between the 2009 and the 2012 National elections, in agreement with our 
individual-level data that place the change more precisely between December 2011 and May 
2012. Furthermore, following the May 2012 election, the coefficients exhibit a more stable 
behavior, even after GD’s leadership was arrested and charged for participation in a criminal 
organisation and complicity to murder. 
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Table 3: Individual-level analysis of the rapid rise of GD 
 
This table reports the results of individual-level regressions with intent to vote for GD as the dependent 
variable, restricting attention to the surveys of December 2011 and December 2012 when the surge in 
GD popularity occurred. Interaction dummies for 2012 capture changes in coefficients between these 
dates. We include regressors the coefficients of which are statistically significant either with or without 
an interaction, but do not keep insignificant interaction terms (based on the LPM). Observations:  3,850 
(1,932 for December 2011 and 1,918 for December 2012). The two rightmost columns report the change 
in GD vote intent due to: 1. changes in coefficients and 2. changes in regressors using the method 
discussed in section 4.3.1. 
  LPM 
Probit 
Coefficients 
Probit 
Marginal Effects 
impact of 
coefficien
t change 
impact of 
regressor 
change  
  
2012 
dummy 
 
2012 
dummy 
 
2012 
dummy     
                  
Constant 0.01 -2.00 -     
  0.02 0.17       
Male Dummy 0.04 0.05 0.35 0.27 0.04 0.03 2.47% -0.01% 
  0.01 0.02 0.10 0.16 0.01 0.02     
Married 0.03 -0.02 0.15 0.16 0.01 0.02 -1.24% 0.05% 
  0.00 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.01     
Married x 
Male 
-0.05 0.01 -0.44 0.10 -0.04 0.01 
0.31% -0.09% 
  0.01 0.01 0.07 0.63 0.01 0.00     
Age (/100) -0.09 -1.06 -0.11 0.00% -0.01% 
  0.02 0.19 0.02     
Secondary  -0.00 0.04 -0.13 0.38 -0.01 0.04 2.43% 0.00% 
  education 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.01     
Gloom 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.32 0.01 0.03 2.17% -0.01% 
  0.01 0.02 0.15 0.17 0.02 0.02     
Immigration 0.04 0.22 0.51 0.54 0.05 0.06 1.87% 0.11% 
  0.02 0.04 0.17 0.18 0.02 0.02     
Crime -0.01 0.05 -0.47 0.77 -0.05 0.08 0.44% 0.02% 
  0.00 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.01     
Transparency 0.03 0.24   0.02   0.00% -0.04% 
  0.02 0.13   0.01       
R2 adjusted 0.12 - -     
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Table 4: Contextual Effects on GD Voting by Election 
 
This table reports the results of regressions with GD vote (%) across Greece's 56 prefectures as the 
dependent variable. We report separate OLS regressions for each election. Regressor definitions and 
data sources are listed in Appendix A1. Statistical significance at the 10% level is indicated in bold. 
"n.a." appears on dates when a regressor is not available.  
Election / Model 
2007-9 
Euro 
2009-5 2009-10 2012-5 2012-6 
Euro 
2014-5 2015-1 
constant 0.00 -0.19 -0.08 0.07 0.93 4.03 1.90 
 
0.02 0.12 0.07 1.38 1.28 2.31 1.63 
Immigration -0.02 0.05 0.02 2.32 1.72 1.08 0.41 
   (Foreigners /10)/Greeks 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.73 0.59 1.00 0.61 
Crime (1000 * Property n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.31 0.23 0.50 0.33 
   crimes per capita) 
   
0.08 0.08 0.15 0.13 
Tourism (Tourists x nights per  0.01 -0.45 -0.19 -4.07 -5.78 -4.31 -2.84 
   capita/100) 0.02 0.14 0.10 1.52 1.63 2.31 1.47 
Unemployment /10 (%) 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.90 0.24 0.49 0.31 
  0.01 0.06 0.03 0.47 0.31 0.51 0.35 
Economic Output (Prefecture 0.02 0.22 0.14 -0.68 0.06 -1.31 -0.01 
   GDP per capita/100) 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.69 0.61 1.02 0.64 
Bounced cheques -0.02 -0.07 0.04 0.40 1.84 -0.43 -0.15 
   (as % of local  bank deposits) 0.03 0.21 0.05 1.26 1.04 0.86 0.90 
Non-performing mortgages n.a. -0.05 -0.04 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 
   (as % of local  bank deposits) 
 
0.06 0.03 0.18 0.10 0.13 0.07 
Right Wing Tradition (Vote 
share 0.04 0.40 0.16 9.07 7.27 9.96 6.12 
   for restoration of King 1974) 0.03 0.16 0.10 1.80 1.66 2.73 1.84 
GD vote total (%) 0.03 0.46 0.29 6.97 6.92 9.40 6.28 
GD vote avg across prefecture 
(%) 
0.04 0.40 0.25 6.58 6.63 9.06 6.01 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.48 0.42 0.57 0.53 0.39 0.36 
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One shortcoming of the regression estimates reported in Table 4 is that they may be subject to 
omitted variable bias associated with effects operating on the GD vote at the electoral district 
level. Table 5 deals with this using fixed and random effects estimation, treating the data across 
elections and prefectures as a panel. Estimates are broadly in line with our previous analysis: 
immigration and crime have an economically and statistically large positive impact on the GD 
vote after 2012, but an insignificant (immigration) and weaker (crime) impact before 2012. 
Financial distress associated with bounced checks seems to lead to an increase in the GD vote 
after 2012 relative to the earlier period, as suggested by the interaction effect with the crisis 
dummy.  
 
One important insight that this contextual analysis adds relative to the individual-level analysis 
is that, after 2012, GD was able to capture significant support in areas with a right-wing 
tradition. Another interesting observation is that in Euro elections, the GD vote is significantly 
larger, reflecting a general pattern in second-order elections, according to which voters are 
more willing to support smaller parties than in national elections16. 
 
Table 5 also presents a decomposition of the change in the actual GD vote between 2009 and 
2012 into a component associated with change in conditions and a component associated with 
changes in behavior, analogous to that presented for the individual-data analysis of Table 3. As 
was the case in the individual-level analysis, changes in behavior is dramatically more important 
than changes in conditions. Almost half the increase is in areas with higher immigration and 
crime, but the overwhelming effect is the increase in GD voting in areas with a long-standing 
right-wing tradition for reasons beyond what we could control for with our data17. The 
contextual analysis leads to weaker estimates (compared to the individual-level analysis) for the 
importance of financial distress as proxied for by bounced checks (0.31%), perhaps because this 
is a poor proxy or because contextually financial distress is less important than it is individually. 
                                                 
16Our key conclusions are robust to various transformations of the regressors, including quadratic terms, first 
differences etc. We also attempted to include several other regressors listed in the Appendix but they were not 
significant.  
17The propagation over time of local political traditions has been observed in a number of studies. For example, 
Voigtlander and Voth (2012) show that anti-Semitism in interwar Germany is spatially correlated with similar 
attitudes five centuries earlier and that these correlations are stronger in areas of low population mobility or 
limited interchange with other cultures.  
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Table 5: Contextual Effects on GD Voting  
Controlling for Fixed and Random Regional Effects 
 
 
The first two columns report panel regressions with fixed and random effects using the same data as 
in Table 4. The missing observations from Table 4 were imputed using the earliest observation 
available, after noticing that there is little variation over time within prefectures in these regressors. 
We include regressors from Table 4 that were statistically significant either with or without an 
interaction term. The third column reports the preferred random effects specification applied to the 
two consecutive elections 2009 and 2012 when GD popularity surged. Regressor definitions and data 
sources are listed in Appendix A1. Robust standard errors are reported below all estimates (White 
1980, 1982). Statistical significance at the 10% level is indicated in bold. The two rightmost columns 
report the change in GD vote due to changes in coefficients and the change due to changes in 
regressors using the method discussed in section 4.3.1 applied to the Random Effects model in 
column 3. 
 
  
FE RE 
RE 09-
12 
impact of 
coefficient change 
impact of 
regressor 
change 
constant 1.74 -0.10 0.14 
  
  1.73 0.09 0.04 
  
Immigration -2.10 -0.20 0.01 
  
   (Foreigners/Greeks) 2.63 0.25 0.04 
  
Crime 0.26 0.05 0.02 
  
   (1000 * Property crimes 
per capita) 0.12 0.03 0.00   
Tourism -11.14 0.60 -0.02 
  
   (Accommodations per 
capita/10) 6.05 0.46 0.11   
Bounced cheques -0.96 -0.77 -0.04   
   (as % of local  bank 
deposits) 0.51 0.37 0.04   
Right Wing Tradition 
(Vote for 
- 
0.45 0.16   
   restoration of King 
1974)   0.19 0.12   
Crisis Dummy 5.08 2.37 1.15 
  
   (1 starting 2012-5) 0.43 0.70 0.66 
  
Immigration x Crisis 
Dummy 1.51 1.07 1.63 
1.40% 0.01% 
  0.92 0.56 0.63 
  
Crime x Crisis Dummy 0.23 0.28 0.26 0.91% 0.07% 
  0.06 0.06 0.05 
  
Tourism x Crisis Dummy -3.94 -4.18 -3.74 -0.36% 0.00% 
  1.79 1.33 1.49 
  
Bounced cheques x Crisis 1.06 1.08 0.92 0.31% -0.01% 
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Dummy 
  0.63 0.51 1.08 
  
RW Tradition x Crisis 
Dummy 
  
7.43 8.63 
2.90% 0.05% 
    1.75 1.75 
  
Dummy 2009-5 Euro 0.49 0.38   
  
  0.13 0.03   
  
Dummy 2009-10 0.69 0.43   
  
  0.21 0.09   
  
Dummy 2012-6 0.03 0.07   
  
  0.12 0.08   
  
Dummy 2014-5 Euro 2.87 2.69   
  
  0.24 0.18   
  
Dummy 2015-1 0.09 -0.23   
  
  0.27 0.17   
  
Adjusted R2 0.95         
Observations 392 392 112     
Number of clusters 56 56 56     
Fixed Effects test 0.00   -     
Hausman test 0.01 0.66     
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3.4. Explaining the change in voting behaviour 
Informed observers of Greek politics have attributed the jump in support for GD to voter-
migration from LAOS, a less extreme right-wing party. At first sight, this seems plausible, 
considering LAOS’ representation in parliament collapsed from five seats to zero between the 
elections in which GD’s vote jumped. Furthermore, the reason for this collapse is widely 
believed to be its participation in the coalition government, from November 2011 to May 2012 
(coinciding with the narrow time frame during which GD’s support in fact increased) that 
undermined its otherwise non-mainstream profile. 
Such an explanation could in principle be consistent with the effects we report in the previous 
subsection, since the change in coefficients in regressions after 2012 could reflect a reduction in 
competition in Greece’s ER when LAOS shifted to more moderate positioning. However, our 
analysis below suggests this is at best only a partial explanation of what happened. Instead, a 
more important reason for the change in behaviour was that GD was able to take issue 
ownership of widespread concern with immigration and crime, ‘ownerless’ issues which no 
other party, including LAOS, had previously been able to capture. 
 
3.4.1. Voter migration from LAOS to GD is limited 
GD’s vote increased from 0.29% to 6.97% between the consecutive elections in 2009 and May 
2012, while LAOS’ dropped from 5.63% to 2.89%18.  This simple observation reveals that it is 
unlikely that an overwhelming portion of GD’s vote came from voters who previously 
supported LAOS. This insight is reinforced in Table 6 where we estimate the party of origin of 
GD voters in the election of May 2012 when GD’s electoral support jumped. According to the 
official exit poll after the 2012 elections, only 18.5% of GD’s voters migrated from LAOS.  
 
We also use Rosen et al.’s (2001) ecological inference for RxC tables, to calculate the political 
origins of the GD vote in May 2012. The results are almost identical to the exit poll transition 
rates for the cases of ND, PASOK and GD and close for the SYRIZA and OTHER parties. Ecological 
inference suggests the probability that a GD voter migrated from LAOS was 9.3%, even lower 
than that obtained in exit polls.  
 
Finally, and this should be interpreted with caution, we report the fraction of individuals who 
intended to vote for GD across all surveys by recall of party voted in the previous election. LAOS 
is a rather small source of voters but LAOS varies significantly in size over our sample. In sum, 
while there was unquestionably a migration of voters from LAOS to GD and perhaps this can 
explain a large portion of LAOS’ collapse, it can only explain a limited fraction of GD’s support.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 This measure underestimates somewhat the collapse in LAOS’ votes because the 2012 vote share corresponds to 
a much lower turnout than in 2009. In fact, LAOS lost 203,280 votes, part of which migrated to GD and contributed 
to its gains of 421,361 votes, 
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Table 6: Analysis of voter transition towards GD  
  
We tabulate estimates of the previous vote for GD supporters around the time of the rapid rise in 
GD support (early 2012).  The first estimate gives the results from the official exit poll after the 
May 2012 elections, (Georgiadou 2013). The second column uses Rosen et al.'s (2001) ecological 
inference. The third column estimates the previous affiliation of individuals declaring intent to vote 
for GD in our individual-level data (10,000 observations) between Dec 2011 and June 2014. 
Party of Origin 
 May 2012 election exit 
poll (%) 
Ecological Inference Rosen 
et al. (2001) (%) 
MRB 
surveys (%) 
ND 28.5 29.2 17.6 
PASOK 36.1 35.2 2.7 
KKE 1.7 6.3 0.3 
SYRIZA 5.0 8.4 4.3 
LAOS 18.5 9.3 1.8 
GD - 0.7 58.5 
OTHER 6.7 10.9 15.0 
 
 
3.4.2. GD law-and-order and anti-immigration political positioning  
Our regression analyses trace a large portion of the increase in GD support back to the change 
in behavior of voters who identify immigration or crime as issues of outstanding importance for 
Greece. Indeed, this is reinforced in Table 7 which shows in a clear and simple manner that GD 
became the only party whose supporters had a disproportionate interest in one of the two 
issues (35% in December 2012 up from 23% in December 2011. The interest across all 
individuals was stable at 16%). Furthermore, this disproportionate interest developed during 
2012 even as the popularity of GD grew very significantly which is important because as a 
party’s popularity increases, the distribution of its supporters’ characteristics will eventually 
converge to the distribution of characteristics across all individuals (16% in this case). The 
interest of supporters of other parties in these issues went down in almost all cases, which is 
strongly suggestive that GD was able to attract individuals with a pre-existing interest in these 
matters from other parties. By contrast, in unreported analysis we found that GD’s ownership 
of the Gloom attitude which we used in Table 3 to explain the GD vote, did not increase 
significantly.  
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Table 7: Political Issue Ownership of Immigration and Crime during GD's rise 
 
This table reports the number and fraction of individuals who identified immigration or crime as 
"one of the three most pressing problems facing the country today" in two surveys from our 
individual-level data, conducted in December 2011 and December 2012 and sampled 2,000 each. 
We only kept individuals who responded to all questions. The last row reports the total number of 
individuals on each date and the fraction of interest for the entire sample. 
 
% identifying immigration or crime among the country's 
three top problems 
Vote Intent 
2011-12 2012-12 
# % # % 
GD 26 23% 220 35% 
LAOS 104 20% 6 17% 
ND 383 15% 366 12% 
PASOK 228 13% 136 18% 
SYRIZA 162 17% 403 14% 
KKE 218 13% 120 9% 
OTHER 811 18% 667 15% 
TOTAL 1,932 16% 1,918 16% 
 
How did GD manage to position itself as the party of choice for voters concerned with these 
issues within the space of a few months? Revisiting the events of early 2012 with the benefit of 
the empirical results we have observed, it seems likely that the intensely anti-immigrant and 
racist speeches of high-ranking party representatives and the violence and aggression of mid-
ranking representatives were appealing to a significant body of the electorate. While media was 
highly critical of GD during this period, this critical attention was –contrary to intent— 
perceived positively by a sizable segment of the electorate. A Google Trends comparison of 
searches (in Greek) for the term Golden Dawn (“Χρυσή Αυγή”) versus the names of the other 
political parties leading to the election in 2012, revealed that GD consistently attracted the 
highest search interest, and that this was increasing steadily over time after the elections (as 
shown in Figure 2). This supports our view that the pre-election period, offered GD an excellent 
opportunity to convey its political message to all those willing to listen. 
 
The timing and speed of GD’s electoral ascent highlight the role of mainstream political parties’ 
actions and omissions in this process. Meguid (2005) stresses the impact of mainstream parties’ 
issue positioning on fringe parties’ electoral fortunes. At the time of GD’s electoral 
breakthrough, Greece’s mainstream parties were tied in a political coalition that imposed 
severe measures and focused almost exclusively on economic issues. This possibly acted in two 
ways; it alienated voters from mainstream politics, leading them to seek outlets to channel 
their protest, and it turned mainstream parties’ focus towards economics, making them neglect 
issues that were central to parts of the electorate and were addressed effectively by GD.  
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In sum, GD was likely successful because it took an extreme position against immigrants and 
convinced voters it was serious about its positions through violence and aggressive 
propaganda. Furthermore, it was abated by media which while criticising GD, were in fact 
disseminating its message, helping it reach a segment of the electorate concerned with issues 
insufficiently emphasised by other parties, including competing right wing-parties like LAOS. 
 
4. Conclusion  
Our econometric analysis of GD voting suggests that GD’s electoral success reflects the 
permanent impact of its successful election campaign in early 2012. In just a few months, GD 
was able to redefine itself as the clear owner of the related issues of immigration and law-and-
order. In both individual-level and contextual GD voting regressions, the GD vote was 
unresponsive to individual characteristics and contextual variables, until the importance of 
certain factors for GD voting changed dramatically, suggesting a marked shift in voting 
behaviour. This effect does not appear to be due as much to GD capturing the vote of other 
right wing parties like LAOS, as it seems to reflect a broad change in behaviour across the 
electorate.  
 
Most importantly, GD was able to capture significantly greater support from individuals with 
pre-existing concerns about immigration and law-and-order and with Greece’s economic 
conditions, particularly young, unmarried males. From a contextual perspective, electoral 
districts with higher immigration, crime and especially right-wing tradition, provided stronger 
support for GD after 2012 than can be explained by changes in the conditions of these regions 
(additional secondary effects were associated with personal bankruptcy rates and tourism). This 
is consistent with our thesis that GD reshaped voter behaviour in early 2012, possibly facilitated 
by media coverage which, while intended as critical, served to deliver GD’s message to a niche 
section of the electorate that was receptive to it. 
 
Interpreting these findings more broadly, ER parties may achieve a significant jump in 
popularity by targeting ownerless issues of concern to segments of the electorate and by 
adopting unorthodox, even criminal methods, which nevertheless appeal to certain voters. This 
strategy is likely to be most successful during political upheavals, when voters abandon their 
party affiliations and re-assess their priorities. On a more optimistic note, while ER voting is 
intensified by factors such as immigration, crisis severity etc., our quantitative analysis suggests 
that the coefficients of such factors seem to be contained, so our evidence suggests a bound on 
the electoral appeal of ER parties, at least unless the political upheaval is far deeper than the 
one observed in Greece. 
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Appendix 
 
A1. Detailed description of our individual-level dataset. 
 
 A1.1 Definitions of Data used in the empirical section 
Gloom: A dummy indicating that an individual responded to five separate questions on the 
current and future personal and country conditions with the most negative – e.g. “very bad” - 
of five options available in the poll (see description of poll in section A1.1.2) 
 
GD vote intention 
Male 
Age (divided by 100) 
Temporarily Unemployed 
Married 
Secondary education 
Urban 
Gloom 
immigration 
crime 
transparency 
 
A1.2 Raw Data 
We analyse data from 5 polls conducted at the following dates: 
1. 1-8 December 2011 
2. 27 November - 6 December 2012 
3. 13-21 June 2013 
4. 2-11 December 2013 
5. 25 June – 4 July 2014 
The polls were conducted with Greek national adults that had voting rights. The geographical 
coverage included the whole of the country (Athens, Thessaloniki, Urban, semi-urban and rural 
areas). The data collection method included a face to face interview with a use of a 
questionnaire and a ballot for secret vote casting. All samples consisted of 2000 individuals 
each. 
The questionnaire included the following variables: 
1. Gender (Male-female) 
2. Age (in brackets of 19-24, 25-34, 35-44… 55-64, 65+) 
3. Profession (self-employed, employed in the private sector, in the public sector, 
 pensioner, temporarily not working, unemployed searching for a job, student, home 
 employed, rentier, not working. 
4. Marital status (not married, married, divorced). 
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5. Education (none/elementary, high school, undergraduate student   
 (University/polytechnic), graduate (University/polytechnic), post graduate student 
 (University/polytechnic). 
6. Area of residency. 
7. Monthly income of the interviewee in Euros (0-450, 450-600, 600-750… 2850-3000, 
 3000+) 
8. Household monthly income (as above). 
9. Attitudes questions: 
 a. “How are things in the country?” (1=very well, 2=relatively well, 3=neither well nor 
 bad, 4=relatively bad 5=very bad, 6=I don’t know, 7=I do not wish to answer). 
 b. “How do you judge the economic conditions in the country today?” (1=very well, 
 2=relatively well, 3=neither well nor bad, 4=relatively bad 5=very bad, 6=I don’t know, 
 7=I do not wish to answer). 
 c. “What is your current personal financial situation?” (1=very well, 2=relatively well, 
 3=neither well nor bad, 4=relatively bad 5=very bad, 6=I don’t know, 7=I do not wish to 
 answer). 
 d. “The economic conditions in the country in the next year will:” (1=improve 
 considerably, 2=improve slightly, 3=remain the same, 4=deteriorate slightly, 
 5=deteriorate considerably, 6=I don’t know, 7=I do not wish to answer). 
 e. “Your personal financial conditions in the next year will:” (1=improve considerably, 
 2=improve slightly, 3=remain the same, 4=deteriorate slightly, 5=deteriorate 
 considerably, 6=I don’t know, 7=I do not wish to answer). 
10. ISSUES: “Identify the three (3) most important problems facing the country today:” 
 (Interviewees were asked to choose from a list containing the following): 
 (education, local-government efficiency, health, transportation/congestion, 
 unemployment, inflation, foreign affairs, pollution, (economic) immigration, drugs, 
 terrorism, tax system, economic development, crime, social security, regional 
 development , government/church relations, transparency, economic convergence, 
 social convergence, fiscal policy). 
11. “Which party did you vote for in the last elections?” Answers differed depending on 
 date according to the following table: 
Party/Poll 
2011-
12 
(DEC) 
2012-
06 
(JUNE) 
2012-
12 
(DEC) 
2013-
12 
(DEC) 
20146 
(JUNE) 
NEW 
DEMOCRACY 
2 1 1 1 1 
SYRIZA 5 2 2 2 2 
PASOK 1 3 3 3 3 
ANEL   4 4 4 4 
GOLDEN 
DAWN 
  5 5 5 5 
IMAR 
(DEMOCRATI
C LEFT) 
  6 6 6 6 
ΚΚΕ 
(COMMUNIS
T PARTY) 
3 7 7 7 7 
DRASI/CREA
ION AGAIN 
  8 8 8 8 
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LAOS 4 9 9 9 9 
GREENS/ECO
LOGISTS 
6 10 10 10 10 
OTHER 7 11 11 11 11 
I WAS NOT 
REGISTERED 
8 12 12 12 12 
I DID NOT 
VOTE 
9 13 13 13 13 
BLANK 10 14 14 14 14 
INVALID 11 15 15 15 15 
I DON’T 
KNOW 
12 16 16 16 16 
I D N’T 
WISH TO 
ANSWER 
13 17 17 17 17 
 
12. “If national (parliamentary) elections were held next week, which party would you most 
 likely vote for?”.  
Party/Poll 
2010-
12 
(DEC) 
2011-06 
(JUNE) 
2011-
12 
(DEC) 
2012-
06 
(JUNE
) 
2012-
12 
(DEC) 
2013-
12 
(DEC) 
NEW DEMOCRACY 2 2 2 1 1 1 
SYRIZA 5 5 5 2 2 2 
PASOK 1 1 1 3 3 3 
ANEL (INDEPENDENT 
GREEKS) 
      4 4 4 
OLDEN DAWN     10 5 5 5 
DIMAR (DEMOCRATIC 
LEFT) 
7 7 7 6 6 6 
ΚΚΕ (COMMUNIST 
PARTY) 
3 3 3 7 7 7 
L OS 4 4 4 8 9 8 
GREENS/ECOLOGISTS 6 6 6 9 10 9 
CONSENSUS FOR NEW 
GREECE 
      10   10 
PLAN B       11   11 
NEW DAY       12   12 
ANTARSYA       13   13 
CHRISTIAN 
DEMOCRATS 
      14   14 
RASI/CREATION 
AGAIN 
        8   
CREATION AGAIN       15   15 
DEMOCRATIC 
ALLIANCE 
8 8 8       
PAN-HELLENIC 
CHARIOT OF CITIZENS 
  9 9       
OTHER 9 10 11 16 11 16 
UNDECIDED 10 11 12 17 12 17 
BLANK 11 12 13 18 13 18 
INVALID 12 13 14 19 14 19 
I DON’T KNOW 13 14 15 20 15 20 
I DON’T WISH TO 
ANSWER 
14 15 16 21 16 21 
BSTAIN 15 16 17 22 17 22 
 
A2. Detailed description of our contextual data 
A2.1 Definitions of Contextual data as listed in Table 1 
GD vote actual: % of valid ballots cast for GD across 56 electoral districts in seven elections.  
Immigration: Percent of inhabitants of foreign origin to indigenous population. Data from the 
Census of 2001 and 2011, imputed for other dates using the method described in Appendix 
A2.2.2 
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Crime: Property crime rate measured as the number of incidents per 1,000 inhabitants. Data of 
regional aggregation from ELAS (Greek Police), Crime Table. Each prefecture is assumed to face 
the same crime rate as the region it belongs to. 
http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=%27..%27&perform=view&id=
43803&Itemid=1149&lang= 
Tourism: tourist visit-days per head of local population recorded in the 201 Census. Data from 
ELSTAT (Greece’s Bureau of Statistics); 
Unemployment: see imputation scheme in section 2.2.1 
Economic Output: GDP per capita in purchasing power standards, from Eurostat 
Bounced checques: the value of bounced checks and mortgages in arrears by electoral district, 
provided by two of Greece’s largest banks. Scaled by district’s bank-deposits; bank deposits 
from the Bank of Greece, Bulletin of Conjectural Indicators; 
Non-performing mortgages: the value of non-serviced mortgages in arrears by electoral 
district, provided by two of Greece’s largest banks. Scaled by district’s bank-deposits; bank 
deposits from the Bank of Greece, Bulletin of Conjectural Indicators; 
Right Wing tradition: Vote share for restoration of King 1974.  
 
A2.2 Construction of our imputed contextual data 
A2.2.1. Unemployment 
Suppose that in a region with (n) prefectures, unemployment rate is available at a regional level 
as well as for (n-1) prefecture, but is missing for prefecture (k). An approximation can be 
constructed along the following lines: 
With (Ui) denoting the number of unemployed persons in prefecture (i, i=1…n), total 
unemployment in the region is given by 
      (A8) 
 
Dividing by populations, the above identity gives: 
      (A9) 
 
With (θi ) denoting the proportion of active to total population (Ni ) in prefecture (i, i=1…n), 
unemployment rate is defined as  
       (A10) 
Population weights are defined as (wi =Ni /N, i=1…n ). Assuming that (θi) is constant across the 
various prefectures in the same region, the unemployment rate in the missing prefecture (k) is 
approximately given by: 
    (A11)  
 
Following this rule, the unemployment rate was recovered for the prefecture of Grevena in the 
region of Western Macedonia, Eyritania in Sterea, Thesprotia in Epirus, Samos in the region of 
Northern Aegean, and Lasithi in Crete. In the region of Ionia, unemployment rate was missing 
for both Cefalonia and Lefkas, thus a common rate was constructed by treating the two as one 
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prefecture. Populations are obtained from the 2011 Census, and weights are assumed to 
remain constant throughout the period 2007-2013. 
 
A2.2.2 Immigration 
Immigration density (f) is defined as the ratio of residents of foreign origin (F) to the native 
population (N) in each area, i.e. f=F/N. The ratio can be computed for the Census years 2001 
and 2011 using the corresponding Census data. Fig. 10 shows that there is a very strong and 
nearly uniform correlation between the densities in the two Census years. The fact that the 
pattern of increasing immigration density is nearly uniform across prefectures, suggests that a 
common logistic curve can be estimated to provide an interpolation for the periods 2002-2010 
as well as extrapolation for 2012-2014. The following Lotka equation is assumed to describe the 
pattern of foreign population changes: 
      (A1) 
 
where (ρ) is the unhindered growth rate of foreign population and (A) denotes the carrying 
capacity of the area. Capacity is assumed to be proportional to the native population, i.e. A=αN, 
as infrastructure, social networks and job opportunities are all increasing in population levels.  
Setting 
        (A2) 
 
Denoting the native population growth rate by , and combining (A1) and (A2) the 
following dynamic equation is obtained for immigration density 
        (A3) 
 
 where λ=(ρ-n) denotes the unhindered growth rate of immigration density and  φ=α(1-n/ρ) is 
the equilibrium value. The former is assumed to remain the same across prefectures, while the 
latter varies and is denoted by (φk ) to reflect the particular   carrying capacity in each 
prefecture (k, k=1…51).  
The general solution of the above differential equation is given by the expression: 
       (A4) 
 
where βk is a constant of integration specified for each prefecture (k, k=1…51).  
 
Terminal conditions fk(0) and fk(T) for T=10 can be calculated by using data from the Census of 
2001 and 2011 respectively. Then the prefecture-specific constants (βk , φk , k=1…51) are easily 
obtained as: 
          (A5a) 
 
      (A5b) 
  
The common rate (λ) is obtained from (A3) by pool-estimating the equation 
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     (A6) 
 
Estimation gives: 
(2001)                        (A7) 
 
             (0.0192)    (0.0051)   
Nobs=51,  Adj R2=0.241,  DW=1.871. SE in brackets. 
This implies an equilibrium immigration value of φ=11.618%.  Equation (A4) is then used to 
obtain estimates of immigration densities over the periods 2002-2010 and 2012-2013.  
 
A3. Nomenclature of political parties 
A3.1. Political parties in Greece 
ND: New Democracy (centre-right) 
PASOK: Pan-Hellenic Socialist Part (centre-left) 
KKE: Communist Party of Greece 
LAOS: Popular Orthodox Alert 
ANEL: Independent Greeks (rightwing) 
GD: Golden Dawn 
Syriza: Coalition of Radical Left 
 
A.3.2. Political parties in other European countries 
ER: Extreme Right 
BNP: British National Party 
NPD: National Democratic Party of Germany 
FPÖ: The Freedom Party of Austria  
FN: Front National of France 
 
A.3.2. Electoral districts of Greece 
 
DISTRICT 
NAME 
Abbreviation 
1 Α΄ ΑΘΗΝΩΝ ATT_AT1 
2 Β΄ ΑΘΗΝΩΝ ATT_AT2 
3 Α΄ ΠΕΙΡΑΙΩΣ ATT_PR1 
4 Β΄ ΠΕΙΡΑΙΩΣ ATT_PR2 
5 ΑΤΤΙΚΗΣ ATT_YAT 
6 Α’ ΘΕΣ/ΝΙΚΗΣ CMAC_SL1 
7 Β’ ΘΕΣ/ΝΙΚΗΣ CMAC_SL2 
8 ΗΜΑΘΙΑΣ CMAC_IMA 
9 ΚΙΛΚΙΣ CMAC_KLK 
10 ΠΕΛΛΑΣ CMAC_PEL 
11 ΠΙΕΡΙΑΣ CMAC_PIE 
12 ΣΕΡΡΩΝ CMAC_SER 
13 ΧΑΛΚΙΔΙΚΗΣ CMAC_HAL 
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14 ΕΒΡΟΥ THRA_EBR 
15 ΞΑΝΘΗΣ THRA_XNT 
16 ΡΟΔΟΠΗΣ THRA_ROD 
17 ΔΡΑΜΑΣ THRA_DRA 
18 ΚΑΒΑΛΑΣ THRA_KAV 
19 ΓΡΕΒΕΝΩΝ WMAC_GRE 
20 ΚΑΣΤΟΡΙΑΣ WMAC_KAS 
21 ΚΟΖΑΝΗΣ WMAC_KOZ 
22 ΦΛΩΡΙΝΗΣ WMAC_FLO 
23 ΑΡΤΑΣ EPIR_ART 
24 ΘΕΣΠΡΩΤΙΑΣ EPIR_TPR 
25 ΙΩΑΝΝΙΝΩΝ EPIR_INA 
26 ΠΡΕΒΕΖΑΣ EPIR_PRE 
27 ΚΑΡΔΙΤΣΗΣ THES_KAR 
28 ΛΑΡΙΣΗΣ THES_LAR 
29 ΜΑΓΝΗΣΙΑΣ THES_MAG 
30 ΤΡΙΚΑΛΩΝ THES_TRK 
31 ΖΑΚΥΝΘΟΥ EPTA_ZAK 
32 ΚΕΡΚΥΡΑΣ EPTA_KER 
33 ΚΕΦΑΛΗΝΙΑΣ EPTA_KEF 
34 ΛΕΥΚΑΔΑΣ EPTA_LEF 
35 ΑΙΤΩΛ/ΝΙΑΣ WGRE_AAK 
36 ΑΧΑΪΑΣ WGRE_AHA 
37 ΗΛΕΙΑΣ WGRE_ELI 
38 ΒΟΙΩΤΙΑΣ STER_BOI 
39 ΕΥΒΟΙΑΣ STER_EYB 
40 ΕΥΡΥΤΑΝΙΑΣ STER_EYR 
41 ΦΘΙΩΤΙΔΟΣ STER_FTH 
42 ΦΩΚΙΔΑΣ STER_FOK 
43 ΑΡΓΟΛΙΔΑΣ PEL_ARG 
44 ΑΡΚΑΔΙΑΣ PEL_AKD 
45 ΚΟΡΙΝΘΙΑΣ PEL_KOR 
46 ΛΑΚΩΝΙΑΣ PEL_LAK 
47 ΜΕΣΣΗΝΙΑΣ PEL_MES 
48 ΛΕΣΒΟΥ AEG_LES 
49 ΣΑΜΟΥ AEG_SAM 
50 ΧΙΟΥ AEG_CHI 
51 ΔΩΔ/ΝΗΣΟΥ AEG_DOD 
52 ΚΥΚΛΑΔΩΝ AEG_KYK 
53 ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΟΥ CRET_HER 
54 ΛΑΣΙΘΙΟΥ CRET_LAS 
55 ΡΕΘΥΜΝΗΣ CRET_RET 
56 ΧΑΝΙΩΝ CRET_CHA 
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